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Sämtliche schriften und briefe series VI volume 4
Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed)
pp 2213-2219


Date: 2nd half 1678 - 1st half 1679?

Translated from the Latin


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METAPHYSICS
MIND, BODY AND SOUL
FREE WILL AND NECESSITY
SCIENCE
POLITICS, LAW AND ETHICS
THEOLOGY

LEIBNIZ: DIALOGUE BETWEEN A THEOLOGIAN AND A MISOSOPHIST1


[A VI 4, p2213]

M. At no time, Theologians, should you not cease to be mad with reason; you rather ought to be wise with faith.

T. We shall stop using reason when the wise God or rational man will cease to be.

M. The wisdom of man is foolishness before God,2 and man's reason is the instrument of error in the divine sphere, rather than the instrument of understanding.

T. A proud wisdom is foolishness before God, for it is confused by God, who humbles the proud;3 and the man who will want to scrutinise the mysteries by reason will be overwhelmed by glory and be blinded by that great splendour, but for the man who seeks God with a sincere heart, God illuminates his reason for him so that he may see his wonders; and just as we do not look directly at the sun but either in water or through coloured glass, likewise a man, whom either a pious disposition or the necessity of defending the faith calls to a more profound contemplation of divine matters, will not gouge out the eyes of reason for thus he will see nothing, but he will examine by means of holy scripture (by whose intervention the great efficacy of the heavenly rays is accommodated to our weakness) as it were through a veil laid over the holy of holies. But this veil shall only then be lifted when we shall no longer look upon God in a mirror or as an enigma, but face to face.4

M. Therefore you think reason should be joined with faith.

T. Why not, if reason convinces us of our faith? For in what other prerogative are we superior to the Mohammedans?

M. We have true miracles; they do not.

T. Much reasoning is required to prove miracles we have not seen; indeed, even if we see them with our very own eyes, we still need much examination lest we be deceived. Besides, [A VI 4, p2214] you know that the miracles of Scripture need another criterion in turn, namely doctrine, for the antichrist will also conjure up signs which, if it were possible, will deceive even the elect.5 Moses said that a prophet who teaches contrary to the law must not be believed, even if he gives signs.6

M. I concede that miracles are to be tested against the rule of doctrine, but of revealed doctrine, I say, not natural.

T. Does not that first revelation itself depend on miracles?

M. Yes it does.

T. Then those first miracles at least should not be tested against another, earlier revelation. What do you say to that? Why do you hesitate?

M. I don't know how you have trapped me and backed me into a corner.

T. You will act in a more noble way if you admit that the trap came not from me but from you.

M. Your arguments are so strong that I would be compelled to agree with you, if I had not learned that all reasonings with regard to the divine sphere must be distrusted.

T. All reasonings, even with regard to the human sphere, are doubtful, that is, they are not to be accepted before careful examination, especially in an important matter.

M. And if no objection to your most recent argument now occurs to me, nevertheless nor will you have anything with which you may respond to mine.

T. Which is?

M. That evidently by granting the analysis of faith into reason, every instance of faith will be human, not divine.

T. The most serious authors who have written about the analysis of faith have resolved this difficulty very well. For one way is the human analysis of faith, inasmuch as there is a motive of credibility, which occurs according to history and according to reason, which examines and confirms the histories; the other is the divine analysis of faith, which occurs according to the effective operation of the holy spirit in our hearts.

[A VI 4, p2215]

M. But that inward discourse of God is sufficient, without reasons, for many people believe in accordance with the simplicity of their own heart, even if they know no reasons for believing.

T. I agree that many people, with the singular benevolence of God adapting itself to the capacity of all, possess a true faith without having any convincing reasons for it, and these people can be saved. But our religion would be wretched if it lacked persuasive arguments, and it would not be preferable to that of the Mohammedans or the pagans, for thus no reason could be given to those asking for one, nor could faith be defended against the impious or even against the doubts which often make pious men anxious.

M. There is something in what you say. Yet I had thought that it was safer to banish every reasoning from theology. For I believed that human principles which are certain prove nothing in the divine sphere.

T. If that were so, not even God's existence could be proved by reasons.

M. Even God's existence is to be proved by revelations and miracles.

T. But I said to you that revelations and miracles are to be examined by reason.

M. But what do you say to this argument, that human principles are not appropriate for the divine sphere?

T. I answer that there are principles common to the divine and human sphere, and theologians have observed this very well. Indeed, I admit physical principles are only human ones, for example that iron does not float in water, or that a virgin does not give birth, for through the absolute power of God, which is beyond nature, the opposite can be brought about; but metaphysical principles are common to the divine and human spheres, because they concern truth and being in general, which is common to God and creatures. Such is the metaphysical principle that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or that the whole is greater than the part. The same goes for logical principles or syllogistic forms, which even God and the angels will acknowledge to be true.

M. But God and angels do not need logic.

T. God certainly doesn't use logic, perhaps angels do - they do not need syllogisms, yet they will not therefore scorn them. I do not do arithmetic with counters, because I know very well how to solve all things with a pen, but I do not therefore scorn counters, or regard them as false.

[A VI 4, p2216]

M. I shall never concede to you that our metaphysical principles are true before God.

T. Then that principle, that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time, is not valid before God or in the divine sphere?

M. Certainly not.

T. None of the holy fathers or learned theologians will agree with you.

M. Even if the learned do not, at least the pious will stand firm on my side.

T. See how pious are the things you say. With that principle (about contradictory things not being permitted at the same time) removed from the divine sphere, we shall be able to accept and reject the deity or the trinity at the same time; and in the same way, we shall be able to be pious and atheists, Catholics and Arians, at the same time.

M. I believed that no word is impossible with God,7 therefore contradictions will not be impossible for God either.

T. If no word is impossible for God, it will even be possible for him to destroy himself, to sin, and other things of that kind.

M. All things are possible for God, except those which are contrary to his perfection.

T. Fine, very well, but contradictions are also contrary to his own perfection, for they would make God absurd, and would make him assert the true and false at the same time, and pursue and forgo his own aim at the same time.

M. I shall admit (because you urge so) this principle of contradiction even in the divine sphere, but I shall not admit that we are able to judge correctly which things are contradictions in the divine sphere.

T. If we have eyes and memory we too can judge about contradiction. For at least it is required that the subject and predicate of a contradictory proposition be the same, i.e., that words and the same sense of the words be the same in both. Whether the eyes will judge that the same words are in both, or whether we understand the same thing through the words in both, our memory or consciousness will tell us, so that only attention is required.

[A VI 4, p2217]

M. I shall perhaps grant this in the easiest arguments, in which a contradiction is readily apparent, but not in the more difficult arguments.

T. In more difficult arguments we need only have more attention, and a long chain of syllogisms can be examined no less surely than a brief argument, for we only have to examine each syllogism separately according to its form and content. So only more time and patience are required with many syllogisms than with a few.

M. But it seems unworthy to me that logic prevails so much in the divine sphere.

T. Do you think that grammar is more worthy than logic? And yet everybody agrees how useful grammar is in explaining a sacred text. And indeed if you reject syllogisms, you reject all reasonings, for all reasonings are always syllogisms, at least imperfect ones, like enthymemes, in which some proposition or sign is implicitly understood. But imperfect ones cannot be more certain than the perfect. In fact the forms of syllogisms are clearly demonstrated with mathematical certainty from that principle of contradiction which you admitted.

M. We can be saved without logic.

T. I agree, for we can even be saved without reasonings, and we are able to reason without syllogisms. Yet we are unable to comprehend and uphold the foundations of faith without reasonings; and we cannot easily elicit the truth in very difficult things or convince an obstinate opponent without logical skills.

M. The holy fathers scorned that subtle method of reasoning in theological matters.

T. Some did, not all. For St. Augustine can be justly called the Father of Scholastic Theology, from which the Master of the Sentences8 and Dr Thomas have derived a great deal.

M. Those who argue the most, are most lacking in faith.

T. Sometimes this is true of those who do it the most, but never of those who do it well.

[A VI 4, p2218]

M. It is safest just to believe whatever the Church believes. You know that short story by Bellarmine, about the person who was debating in a contest with the devil.9

T. I suppose you are joking, for that story is ludicrous. Nor do I think you will use the same circular argument as he did: I believe whatever the church believes, and the church believes what I believe.10 In addition it is necessary to establish the church on firm reasons.

M. I have always been pleased by the modesty of those who humbly profess that they believe without any inquiry.

T. Believe me, often those who seriously speak like that are either very simple (and God is nonetheless able to give them the true faith since they will have done what is in them to do) or true hypocrites and secret atheists. Pomponatius was accustomed to speak like this, and Vaninus, who, declining to respond to objections with this excuse, were forsaking the cause of God. For when they introduced serious problems they pretended that they were yielding to the authority of the church and that these problems were not obstacles. There is no greater enemy of religion and piety than he who asserts faith contrary to reason, which is to prostitute faith before the wise. Even great popes and councils and faculties of theology, with the observed skill of hypocrites, have forbidden that twofold truths, one divine, the other human, should be set up in contradiction of each other.11

M. You almost persuade me that I should trust that human reason, when properly grasped, never conflicts with the revealed divine faith; nor does the word of God, which has been written or handed down, differ from the natural law engraved in our hearts since birth (as Paul attests).12

T. Since I seem to have reduced you to a more moderate position, I shall in turn concede something to you, so that we may shake hands and be more readily united. For as I believe that our natures were created for meditating, and even those burning with a true zeal for piety should not be the least dissuaded from the contemplation of divine things, for noble things can be elicited, by which even piety may be aroused and faith defended and increased, and the glory of God exalted, so in turn I am less pleased by those barren ratiocinators and wretched debaters who possess nothing profound, nothing solid, but arguing by useless frivolities and insane quarrels lose even the truth and also offend charity. It was better that these people [A VI 4, p2219] be saved by simple faith than that they be condemned by an ambitious but empty and hollow theology; but those who have come via true reasons and profound meditations to a clear acquaintance of the truth - their faith also depends on firm foundations and is conspicuous by an effective charity. Thus we should be wary not of solid reason but of the empty sophistical one of deceivers, and we should believe as certain that no one on the earth is closer to heaven than one who, imbued with the deep truths of mystical theology, rejoices in the feeling of divine love, especially if he spreads his own happiness to others; for it is to be considered as demonstrated that, as every person in this mortal life advances further in the knowledge and love of God (love surely follows from true knowledge) and is the cause of a greater good, so he will endure many years there with a greater glory.




NOTES:

1. I.e. a person who hates wisdom.
2. 1 Corinthians 3.19.
3. Cf. 1 Corinthians 1.17-31.
4. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13.12.
5. A paraphrase of Matthew 24.24: 'For there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.'
6. An allusion to Deuteronomy 13.1-3.
7. Cf. Luke 1.37.
8. Peter Lombard.
9. Robert Bellarmine, De arte bene moriendi (Antwerp, 1620), II.9.
10. Cf. New Essays bk. IV, ch. XX (A VI 6, p521/NE p521): 'Cardinal Bellarmine even believed that there is nothing superior to that childlike faith in which one submits to an established authority, and he reports with approval the words of a dying man who kept the devil at bay by means of this circle which he was heard to recite over and over: "I believe whatever the Church believes. The Church believes what I believe."'
11. The doctrine of twofold truth was condemned in session 8 (held 19 December 1513) of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517).
12. An allusion to Romans 2.15: 'Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts.'


© Lloyd Strickland 2006
With gratitude to John Thorley for advice and suggestions