|
Source: Sämtliche schriften und briefe series VI volume 4 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed) p 58 Date: October 1677 - December 1678 (?) Translated from the Latin View this translation in PDF format (9k) Back to home page Search texts by keyword(s): (For search strings, just type the words; don't use quotation marks) |
LEIBNIZ: ON DISTINCT PERCEPTION[A VI 4, p58] We perceive distinctly that whose parts or attributes we perceive as pertaining to it, for example, when a man is before us, we perceive his face, and at the same time we think that the face pertains to this man. Otherwise, when we cast our eyes into a crowd, we perceive individual men and the faces of the individuals turned toward us, but we do so confusedly. And when we hear a far-off sound of rushing water, we hear the noise of a great many waves, for there is no reason why we should hear the sound of one rather than that of another; and if we did not hear the sound of any, we would not hear anything; but this perception is confused. Therefore a distinct perception occurs while we attribute something similar of ourselves to things, for we know that we are a subject of various attributes, and so in a similar way we consider objects as certain substances or things. And a distinct perception is that which occurs together with some judgement without affirmation and negation. Thought is distinct imagination. © Lloyd Strickland 2007 |